Tópico: Diversos artigos sobre as origens do terrorismo

[Buckaroo Banzai]

THE SOCIOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY OF TERRORISM:
     WHO BECOMES A TERRORIST AND WHY?
     A Report Prepared under an Interagency Agreement
              by the Federal Research Division,
                     Library of Congress
                      September 1999
                             Author:        Rex A. Hudson




                                      PREFACE
The purpose of this study is to focus attention on the types of individuals and
groups that are prone to terrorism (see Glossary) in an effort to help improve U.S.
counterterrorist methods and policies.
The emergence of amorphous and largely unknown terrorist individuals and
groups operating independently (freelancers) and the new recruitment patterns of
some groups, such as recruiting suicide commandos, female and child terrorists,
and scientists capable of developing weapons of mass destruction, provide a
measure of urgency to increasing our understanding of the psychological and
sociological dynamics of terrorist groups and individuals. The approach used in
this study is twofold. First, the study examines the relevant literature and
assesses the current knowledge of the subject. Second, the study seeks to
develop psychological and sociological profiles of foreign terrorist individuals and
selected groups to use as case studies in assessing trends, motivations, likely
behavior, and actions that might deter such behavior, as well as reveal
vulnerabilities that would aid in combating terrorist groups and individuals.
Because this survey is concerned not only with assessing the extensive literature
on sociopsychological aspects of terrorism but also providing case studies of
about a dozen terrorist groups, it is limited by time constraints and data
availability in the amount of attention that it can give to the individual groups, let
alone individual leaders or other members. Thus, analysis of the groups and
leaders will necessarily be incomplete. A longer study, for example, would allow
for the collection and study of the literature produced by each group in the form
of autobiographies of former members, group communiqués and manifestos,
news media interviews, and other resources. Much information about the
terrorist mindset (see Glossary) and decision-making process can be gleaned
from such sources. Moreover, there is a language barrier to an examination of the
untranslated literature of most of the groups included as case studies herein.
Terrorism databases that profile groups and leaders quickly become outdated,
and this report is no exception to that rule. In order to remain current, a terrorism
database ideally should be updated periodically. New groups or terrorist leaders
may suddenly emerge, and if an established group perpetrates a major terrorist
incident, new information on the group is likely to be reported in news media.
Even if a group appears to be quiescent, new information may become available
about the group from scholarly publications.
There are many variations in the transliteration for both Arabic and Persian. The
academic versions tend to be more complex than the popular forms used in the
news media and by the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS). Thus, the
latter usages are used in this study. For example, although Ussamah bin Ladin is
the proper transliteration, the more commonly used Osama bin Laden is used in
this study.





http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/pdf-files/Soc_Psych_of_Terrorism.pdf








Scott Atran - Relevant Articles on Terrorism



"Reframing Sacred Values," by Scott Atran & Robert Axelrod, Negotiation Journal, July 2008 (negj0708.pdf, 165.0 kb, 07-04-2008)
     
Sacred values differ from material or instrumental values in that they incorporate moral beliefs that drive action in ways dissociated from prospects for success. Across the world, people believe that devotion to essential or core values – such as the welfare of their family and country, or their commitment to religion, honor, and justice – are, or ought to be, absolute and inviolable. Counterintuitively, understanding an opponent’s sacred values, we believe, offers surprising opportunities for breakthroughs to peace. Because of the emotional unwillingness of those in conflict situations to negotiate sacred values, conventional wisdom suggests that negotiators should either leave sacred values for last in political negotiations or try to bypass them with sufficient material incentives. Our empirical findings and historical analysis suggest that conventional wisdom is wrong. In fact, offering to provide material benefits in exchange for giving up a sacred value actually makes settlement more difficult because people see the offering as an insult rather than a compromise. But we also found that making symbolic concessions of no apparent material benefit might open the way to resolving seemingly irresolvable conflicts. We offer suggestions for how negotiators can reframe their position by demonstrating respect, and/or by apologizing for what they sincerely regret. We also offer suggestions for how to overcome sacred barriers by refining sacred values to exclude outmoded claims, exploiting the inevitable ambiguity of sacred values, shifting the context, provisionally prioritizing values, and reframing responsibility.

"Mutually Assured Support: A Security Doctrine for Terrorist Nuclear Weapon Threats," by Baruch Fischhoff, Scott Atran, Marc Sageman. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. 618, No. 1, 160-167 (2008) (fischhoff_atran_sageman_publi shed_mas.pdf, 75.0 kb, 06-21-2008)
     
If the United States were subject to a terrorist nuclear attack, its president would face overwhelming political pressure to respond decisively. A well-prepared response could help both to prevent additional attacks and to bring the perpetrators to justice. An instinctive response could be cataclysmically ineffective, inflicting enormous collateral damage without achieving either deterrence or justice. An international security doctrine of Mutually Assured Support can make the response to such attacks more effective as well as less likely—by requiring preparations that reduce the threat. The doctrine requires all subscribing nations to mobilize fully in support of the attacked nation, in return for a promise of nonretaliation. It provides a vehicle for domestic and international leadership, allowing the president to engage the American people, from a position of strength, around an issue that has had little public discussion. The authors describe its rationale, implications, and implementation.

"The Making of a Terrorist: A Need for Understanding from the Field" (atran_congress_12march08.pdf, 3582.0 kb, 03-16-2008)
     
Testimony before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Washington, DC, March 12, 2008

"Who Becomes a Terrorist Today?" (http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/option=com_rokzine&view=article&id=37&Itemid=54, 03-05-2008)
     
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. II, Issue 5, March 2008

"Radical madrassas in Southeast Asia" (with J. Magouirk & J. GInges) (http://www.ctc.usma.edu/sentinel/CTCSentinel-Vol1Iss3.pdf, 03-18-2008)
     
CTC Sentinel, vol. I, issue 3, February 2008

"Terrorism and Radicalization: What to do, What not to do," Presentation to U.S. State Dept. / UK House of Lords, Oct / Nov '07 (http://www.edge.org/3rd_culture/Atran07/index.html, 11-24-2007)

"Sacred Barriers to Conflict Resolution," Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod, Richard Davis (atran_et_al_science_mag_24080 7.pdf, 131.0 kb, 08-23-2007)
     
SCIENCE magazine vol. 317, pp. 1039-1040, 24 August 2007

"Sacred bounds on rational resolution of violent political conflict," Jeremy Ginges, Scott Atran, Douglas Medin, and Khalil Shikaki (pnas_sacred_bounds.pdf, 613.0 kb, 05-01-2007)
     
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences USA | May 1, 2007 | vol. 104 | no. 18 | 7357-7360 (We report a series of experiments carried out with Palestinian and Israeli participants showing that violent opposition to compromise over issues considered sacred is (i) increased by offering material incentives to compromise but (ii) decreased when the adversary makes symbolic compromises over their own sacred values. These results demonstrate some of the unique properties of reasoning and decision-making over sacred values. We show that the use of material incentives to promote the peaceful resolution of political and cultural conflicts may backfire when adversaries treat contested issues as sacred values.)

"Genesis of suicide terrorism," Science magazine, March 2003, v. 299, pp. 1534-1539. (science-gst.pdf, 633.0 kb, 01-20-2005)
     
Contemporary suicide terrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in poverty and ignorance. Recent research indicates they have no appreciable psychopathology and are as educated and economically well-off as surrounding populations. A first line of defense is to get the communities from which suicide attackers stem to stop the attacks by learning how to minimize the receptivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organizations.

"The surrogate colonization of Palestine, 1917-1939," American Ethnologist 16:716-744, 1989. (surrogatecolonization.doc.pdf, 174.0 kb, 01-25-2005)

"Stones against the iron fist, terror within the nation: Alternating structures of violence and cultural identity in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 1939-1989," Politics and Society, 18:481-526, 1990. (satran_stones.doc.pdf, 273.0 kb, 01-25-2005)

Résumé en français COURRIER INTERNATIONAL (http://www.courrierinternational.com/article.asp?obj_id=3588&provenance=hebdo, 01-20-2005)
     
Genèse de l'attentat suicide, 8 August 2003

<<Genesis and Future of Suicide Terrorism>> Web Debate (http://www.interdisciplines.org/terrorism/language/en, 01-20-2005)
     
INTERDISCIPLINES. International Web Debate, organized by the National Center for Scientific Research, CNRS, France. July 2003

Web Debate (Version Française (http://www.interdisciplines.org/terrorism/language/fr, 01-20-2005)
     
Re: <> (target article). INTERDISCIPLINES. Web Debate, organized by the National Center for Scientific Research, CNRS, France.

"The Strategic Threat from Suicide Terror" (http://www.aei-brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=410, 01-25-2005)
     
AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Related Publication 03-33, Dec. 2003

"STRATEGIC BLUNDER: CONFOUNDING ROGUE STATES AND TERRORIST NETWORKS" (rogue_states2-13-04.pdf, 210.0 kb, 01-26-2005)
     
Paper Presented to Conference on "Roots of Terrorism," University of Michigan, March 2004

“The Jihadist Mutation” (http://www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume_id=400&&issue_id=2929, 01-24-2005)
     
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, v. 2 no. 6, 25 March 2004

"Individual Factors in Suicide Terrorism," and "'Fictive Kin' in Suicide Terrorism," Science magazine, April 2004 letters (http://www.rcgd.isr.umich.edu/roots/AtranSciLet0401204.pdf, 07-23-2004)

Supplementary Online Material, SCIENCE, April 2004 (http://www.rcgd.isr.umich.edu/roots/AtranSciSom040204.pdf, 07-23-2004)

"Soft Power and the Psychology of Suicide Bombing" (http://www.jamestown.org/images/pdf/ter_002_011.pdf, 01-24-2005)
     
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, v. 2 no. 11, 3 June 2004

"Combating al-Qaeda's splinters: Mishandling suicide terrorism." The Washington Quarterly 27:67-90 (summer 2004) (http://www.twq.com/04summer/docs/04summer_atran.pdf, 01-20-2005)
     

"Trends in Suicide Terrorism: Sense and Nonsense" (atran-trends.pdf, 317.0 kb, 01-25-2005)
     
Presented to the World Federation of Scientists Permanent Monitoring Panel on terrorism, Erice, Sicily, Aug. 2004

"Tuning Out Hell's Harpists: Interviews with Hamas" (satran0105.pdf, 139.0 kb, 01-25-2005)
     
Up dated Version of Paper on Hamas Presented to the Permanent Monitoring Panel on terrorism, World Federation of Scientists, Geneva, Oct. 2004

"Religion's evolutionary landscape: Counterintuition, commitment, compassion, communion," Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (2005) (atran-norenzayanbbs05.pdf, 1432.0 kb, 01-20-2005)

"Facing Catastrophe - Risk and Response: The 9/11 and 11-M Commissions’ Blind Sides" (http://aei-brookings.org/policy/page.php?id=207, 03-14-2005)
     
Paper prepared for the International Summit on "Democracy, Terrorism and Security," Madrid, 8-11 March 2005 (AEI-Brookings Joint Center For Regulatory Studies), Policy Matters, 05-05, March 2005)

"The 'Virtual Hand' of Jihad" (http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369701, 05-22-2005)
     
Jamestown Terrorism Monitor, v. 3 no. 10, 19 May 2005

Suicide Terrorism Database 2004 (suicide_terrorism_database_20 04.xls, 125.0 kb, 07-26-2005)
     
All suicide attacks in Iraq for 2004, summary of attacks worldwide, 2001-2004

"The Emir" (http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2369782, 09-20-2005)
     
An Interview with Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, Alleged Leader of the Southeast Asian Jemaah Islamiyah Organization (Jamestown Foundation, Spotlight on Terrorism, Volume 3, Issue 9, September 15, 2005)

Interview with Abu Bakr Ba'asyir (atranba_asyirinterview020905. pdf, 147.0 kb, 11-01-2005)
     
Full interview in English and Behasa Indonesia with the alleged leader of Jemaah Islamiyah, from Cipinang prison, Jakarta, August 13 and 15, 2005. I have been using interviews like this to probe theoretical questions, including the limits of rational choice and utility theories (vs the role of sacred values in decision making and judgement), the fundamental attribution error, and ideas of essentialism. There have been similar interviews with Hamas leaders and and the questionnaire has also been given to mujahedin in various places (also to two groups of Islamic schools, moderate and radical)

"Small Groups Find Fatal Purpose Through the Web," Nature, v. 436, no. 7059,p. 620. (atran-sternnature.pdf, 105.0 kb, 10-04-2005)
     
co-authored with Jessica Stern

"To Jihad and Back," Foreign Policy, November-December, 2005, pp. 78-80 (fp_-_to_jihad_and_back.pdf, 26.0 kb, 11-01-2005)
     
Interview with former Jemaah Islamiyah regional leader Nasir Abas and review of his book "Unveiling Jemaah Islamiyah"

"Risk in the Wild" (ratranaaas0206.pdf, 142.0 kb, 03-16-2008)
     
AAAS annual Meeting, “Risk and Society” Panel (Sunday, 19 February 2006)

"The Moral Logic and Growth of Suicide Terrorism", Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, pp. 127-147, spring 2006 (twq06spring_atran.pdf, 133.0 kb, 02-26-2006)
     
Whereas Martyrdom actions once primarily consisted of organized campaigns by militarily weak forces aiming to end the perceived occupation of their homeland, as argued by political scientist Robert Pape in Dying to Win, suicide attacks today serve as banner actions for a thoroughly modern, global diaspora inspired by religion and claiming the role of vanguard for a massive, media-driven transnational political awakening. Living mostly in the diaspora and undeterred by the threat of retaliation against original home populations, jihadis, who are frequently middle-class, secularly well educated, but often “born-again” radical Islamists, including converts from Christianity, embrace apocalyptic visions for humanity’s violent salvation. In Muslim countries and across western Europe, bright and idealistic Muslim youth, even more than the marginalized and dispossessed, internalize the jihadi story, illustrated on satellite television and the Internet with the ubiquitous images of social injustice and political repression with which much of the Muslim world’s bulging immigrant and youth populations intimately identifies. From the suburbs of Paris to the jungles of Indonesia, I have interviewed culturally uprooted and politically restless youth who echo a stunningly simplified and decontextualized message of martyrdom for the sake of global jihad as life’s noblest cause. They are increasingly as willing and even eager to die as they are to kill.

Commentary: A Failure of Imagination (Intelligence, WMDs and ‘Virtual Jihad’). Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29:263-278, 2006 (atran-sct-0406.pdf, 98.0 kb, 03-22-2006)
     
Intelligence estimates based on models keyed to frequency and recency of past occurrences make people less secure even if they predict most harmful events. The U.S. presidential commission on WMDs, the 9/11 commission, and Spain’s comisión 11-M have condemned the status quo mentality of the intelligence community, which they see as being preoccupied with today’s “current operations” and tactical requirements, and inattentive to tomorrow’s far-ranging problems and strategic solutions. But the overriding emphasis in these commissions’ recommendations is on further vertically integrating intelligence collection, analysis, and operations. Such proposals to further centralize intelligence and unify command and control are not promising given recent transformations in Jihadist networks to a somewhat “leaderless resistance” in the wake of Al Qaeda’s operational demise. To defeat terrorist networks requires grasping novel relations between an englobing messianic moral framework, the rootless intellectual and physical mobility of immigrant and diaspora communities, and the overarching conceptual, emotional, and logistical afford- ances of the Internet. Britain’s WWII experience provides salutary lessons for think- ing creatively with decentralized expertise and partially autonomous approaches.

Global Network Terrorism (atrannsc-042806.pdf, 3171.0 kb, 04-29-2006)
     
Briefing to the National Security Council, White House, April 28, 2006

Connecting the Dots, Scott Atran & Marc Sageman (atran-sagemanbas.pdf, 169.0 kb, 06-24-2006)
     
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July-August-2006, "Turn Back the Clock"

"Terror in the Mountains: A Series of Brutal Killings in Kashmir has not been Reported in the Pakistani Press. Why?" (azadkashmirthefirstpost100706 .pdf, 246.0 kb, 07-10-2006)
     
The First Post, 10 July 2006

"WHAT WOULD GANDHI DO TODAY? NONVIOLENCE IN AN AGE OF TERRORISM" (atran-gandhi_conference_120906.pdf, 81.0 kb, 07-14-2006)
     
Prepared for Gandhian Nonviolence Conference, Georgetown University and MK Gandhi Institute for Nonviolence, September 2006, Washington, DC, Co-Chairs, Madeline Albright, Peter Burleigh; Participants/ Peter Ackerman, Scott Atran, David Cortright, Luis Moreno OCampo, Amartya Sen

"Sacred Values: Report on Meetings with Hamas Leaders in Gaza" (sacred_valuesbas190706.pdf, 175.0 kb, 07-19-2006)
     
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Web Exclusive, July-August 2006

Preliminary Remarks on the "Devoted Actor vs. Rational Actor Models in Understanding World Conflict" (http://cstsp.aaas.org/content.html?contentid=621, 09-29-2006)
     
Presented to THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL, THE WHITE HOUSE, 14 September 2006

"Beyond Belief: Religion, Science, Politics and Survival," followup to the Salk Institute debate (http://www.edge.org/discourse/bb.html, 11-29-2006)
     
In response to suggestions about continuing the conversation I had on the podium with Richard Dawkins and Sam Harris at the Salk Institute conference on "Beyond Belief," here I would like to elaborate a bit on what I said at the time. I am always very, very leery when scientists use science to justify political or moral missions. Science can sometimes deeply inform politics or ethics; however, I do not think that science can justify either. I find it fascinating that brilliant scientists and philosophers have no clue how to deal with the basic irrationality of human life and society other than to insist against all reason and evidence that things ought to be rational and evidence based.

"Balancing Act: Pakistan," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December, 2006 (atran_pakistan_bas.pdf, 75.0 kb, 12-06-2006)
     
The 7.6 magnitude earthquake that struck Pakistan last October killed 75,000 people and left 3 million homeless. But the deaths would not end there. In May, the Pakistani army managed to force out most remaining foreign relief workers from the still-devastated region of Azad Kashmir, the Pakistan-controlled part of the disputed province. Just days later, 38 people in villages of southern Azad Kashmir had their throats cut or were beheaded. The youngest victim was four months old.

"Counting Causualties: A Framework for Respectful, Useful Records," Baruch Fischhoff, Scott Atran, Noam Fischhoff (jru_counting_casualties_final .pdf, 319.0 kb, 01-08-2007)
     
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 2007

TERROR NETWORKS AND SACRED VALUES (synopsis_atran-sageman_nsc_brief_28_march_2007.pdf, 45.0 kb, 04-05-2007)
     
Synopsis of report from Madrid – Morocco – Hamburg – Palestine – Israel – Syria Delivered to NSC staff, White House, Wednesday, March 28, 2007, 4 pm, by Scott Atran, Robert Axelrod and Richard Davis (co-principal researcher, Marc Sageman, was not at the meeting but represented)

Supporting Material for "Sacred Bounds on Rational resolution of Violent Political Conflict," PNAS | May 1, 2007 | vol. 104 | no. 18 | 7357-7360 (pnas_sacred_bounds_supporting _materials.pdf, 121.0 kb, 05-01-2007)

"The Nature of Belief" (atran_science_nature_of_belie f_270707.pdf, 60.0 kb, 07-28-2007)
     
Science Magazine, July 27, 2007

“Band of Brothers”: Civil Society and the Making of a Terrorist, The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, Vol.10 (4), August 2008 (http://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol10iss4/art_3.htm#_ftn1, 09-18-2008)
     
The only way to effectively intervene in the radicalization process to violence and terrorism in a way that is sustainable in the long term is through field-based scientific research. Approaches based on “gut feelings,” or on theories that are not systematically built or tested on data from the field, will not prevent the next and future generations of youth from taking a path to political violence, no matter how effective may be law-enforcement and military measures in the short term.


http://sitemaker.umich.edu/satran/relevant_articles_on_terrorism