Tópico: Linguagem e pensamento. Hipótese Sapir-Whorf e etc.

[_tiago]

 

Eu detesto essa... Só existe na mente
Tem um nome esse tipo de postura.

[Filosofo Superficial]

Vocês estão vendo a existência universal, o todo, a verdade final, quando, na verdade, o que se quer dizer é que, sem a nossa existência, nada existiria para nós, sem nós, o universo não existiria, não para nós, nós próprios existimos, por que podemos nos observar, o universo que observamos só existe por que podemos observar ele, se não pudessemos, o que observamos não existiria para nós, não existiria.

"Mas um copo é um copo, se não existi-se ele ainda seria um copo, ele ainda existiria"

Como se pode saber isso? Você não existiria para ver o copo ali, não saberia que ele existe.

"Se não houve-se vida na terra os planetas ainda estariam aqui, o sol..."

Como se pode saber, se não haveria alguem para olhar isso? O nosso universo observavel só existe por que existimos.

[Buckaroo Banzai]

Sem querer ser chato, mas já não tem ums cinco tópicos recentes/simultâneos lidando com essas coisas, de "o que é a realidade", "limites empíricos da ciência", e tudo mais?

[Filosofo Superficial]

Sem querer ser chato, mas já não tem ums cinco tópicos recentes/simultâneos lidando com essas coisas, de "o que é a realidade", "limites empíricos da ciência", e tudo mais?

Sim, pelo jeito alguem tem tendência e cair nessa tema...

[AleYsatis]

Sem querer ser chato, mas já não tem ums cinco tópicos recentes/simultâneos lidando com essas coisas, de "o que é a realidade", "limites empíricos da ciência", e tudo mais?

Sim, pelo jeito alguem tem tendência e cair nessa tema...

De fato, problema é que não encontrei respostas de vocês, ou não as compreendi... De qualquer forma já cansei de tratar desses assuntos aqui mesmo... Então passo a vez, ao invés de continuar essa discussão...

[Geotecton]

[...]
Como se pode saber, se não haveria alguem para olhar isso? O nosso universo observavel só existe por que existimos.

O Universo e a Terra existiam antes dos humanos surgirem e continuarão existindo por um longuíssimo tempo depois que formos extintos.

[Buckaroo Banzai]

[...] Alice Gaby: We developed a set of pictures, so one set would have a picture of a whole banana and then another picture where the banana has been slightly peeled, another picture where a bite has been taken off the top of the banana, and another picture where the banana has been mostly eaten and then finally a picture of the empty banana skin. So we would ask them to lay them out from first to last—an English speaker would put the picture of the whole banana to their left and then the banana that’s been slightly peeled just right of that and then continuing all the way along until at the right most end they’d have the picture of the empty banana skin.

So because of our language and also our habits of literacy the English speakers are trying to show a temporal relationship across the left to right axis, so the earliest banana on their left, the latest banana on their right.

Now if we give this same set of cards to a speaker of Kuuk Thaayorre in Pormpuraaw we found that they were tending to show the full banana at the east and the empty banana to the west with all the intermediate stages flowing from east to west. So it’s quite a different mode of representation.

[...]

There are different ways that languages influence us. Let me give you an example that I think has immediate real world consequences. Languages differ in how they describe causal events and let’s talk about accidents in particular. In English we don’t make a very strong distinction between an accidental event and an intentional event. So if I break a cup accidentally, or if I grab it in anger and smash in on the ground in both cases it’s fine to say 'she broke the cup'. But in some languages if it’s an accident you would use a different grammatical form, you would say 'the cup broke', or 'the cup broke itself', or 'to her it happened that the cup broke,' or something like that. So you would distinguish that event as being an accident in the grammatical form.

So one thing that we wondered was whether speakers who speak such languages that really more strongly distinguish accidents from intentional actions pay attention to events differently. So we compared the speakers of English, Spanish and Japanese. Spanish and Japanese of course are very different from one another but they both differ from English in that they differentiate accidents from intentional actions more strongly than English does. And what we did is we showed everyone videos of accidents and videos of intentional actions and they are simple actions like someone popped the balloon and it was either intentional or accidental.

We asked one group of people to describe the videos to make sure that the differences between languages were real, and they were. And we asked another group of people just to watch the videos and try to remember them and later we tested their memory. What we found in the descriptions was English speakers were much more likely to mention the agent when describing an accident than were speakers of Japanese of Spanish. So if someone accidently popped the balloon English speakers would still say he popped the balloon whereas speakers of Spanish or Japanese might not mention the agent.

When we looked at the memory results we saw a pattern that mirrored the language data. So what we saw is the English speakers remembered really well when someone intentionally popped the balloon, and they also remembered really well, equally well when someone accidently popped the balloon, it didn’t matter to them whether the action was intentional or accidental, they remembered who did it. For Spanish and Japanese speakers they remembered who did it really well when it was an intentional action but less well when it was an accident. So when it was an accident if they were describing it they weren't likely to mention the agent and they also weren’t paying attention to who the person was as much, they were distributing their attention elsewhere..

So that to me is an example of a cross-linguistic difference with important real world consequences. Of course we want to think about how we blame people, how we distribute punishment, how we participate in eye witness testimony and what kinds of elements of our culture or our language are contributing to our judgments. To what extent do we maybe judge people too harshly because of the structure of our language or to what extent do other people maybe avoid responsibility because of the structure of their language and so on. There are no right answers to these questions but they lead us to think about how we come to make these important judgments about other people.

[...]

There are really interesting cases that already exist, case studies of translation for example in the courtroom. So one example comes from the work of Dan Slobin, he cites the case where a Spanish speaking defendant is giving testimony and the defendant says in Spanish ‘I was holding her [his girl-friend] at the top of the stairs and then to me it happened that she fell’ essentially. The way this is translated for the English speaking court is ‘I was holding her then I dropped her down the stairs'. That has a very different feeling than the original Spanish and it raises questions about what would even be the correct way to translate that. This is an example of where a simple question about the relationship between language and thought is actually being adjudicated in the court. For me this is an empirical question, something that we should adjudicate in the lab.

[...]

http://www.abc.net.au/radionational/programs/allinthemind/how-language-shapes-thought/4329212#transcript

[Buckaroo Banzai]

As pessoas se comportam de maneira bastante diferente ao jogar um mesmo jogo, dependendo do nome que se dá ao jogo. Se é o "jogo da comunidade", as pessoas são mais cooperativas; já se o mesmo jogo é chamado de "jogo da bolsa de valores", as pessoas são mais competitivas e não se ajudam mutuamente.

[...]

The ‘name of the game’
In 2004, researchers at Stanford University observed people playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a much-studied game of cooperation or betrayal where individuals can demonstrate altruistic, strategic or selfish motives. They created two versions of the game, totally identical except in name: half the participants played the ‘Wall Street Game’, and the other half the ‘Community Game’. The Wall Street players were consistently more likely to betray the other players and attempt to win the highest rewards through selfish means. But those who played the Community game, on the other hand, tended to cooperate with their counterparts.

The experiment ran with a group of American students and a group of Israeli Air Force trainees, and the findings were the same. To ensure that this pattern of play was unaffected by the personality traits of the participants, the researchers also asked participant’s friends and colleagues to rate how likely that person was to co-operate or betray during the game. In both experiments this rating had no ability to predict the outcome: it was simply the wording of the title that affected people’s playing style.

The obvious question to ask is how the title of the game affected play. There seem to be three possibilities: it may have shaped the participants’ personal motivations towards the game; their expectations of how others would play; or both. In the Wall Street game, for example, people may have assumed that other players would be ruthless and uncooperative, and so changed their tactics accordingly. The evidence suggests it is a mix. In both the Wall Street and the Community games, when people anticipated betrayal in others, they chose to respond with the same. But cooperation was different. When participants in the Community game expected cooperation, they generally opted to cooperate in return. In the Wall Street game, however, participants expecting cooperation chose to exploit it by betraying others.

[...]


http://valuesandframes.org/money-talks-the-impact-of-economic-framing-on-how-we-act-and-feel/

Acho que já vi algo do Dan Ariely ou algum outro cara sobre a idéia de "dinheiro" ter um efeito de "priming", em deixar as pessoas mais mesquinhas e até desonestas.

[Moro]

One report relates how a speaker of Tzeltal from southern Mexico was blindfolded and spun around more than 20 times in a darkened house. Still blindfolded and dizzy, he pointed without hesitation at the geographic directions.

maneira estranha de se citar uma fonte em um artigo científico

[Buckaroo Banzai]

Curiosamene essa é praticamente a linguagem do artigo original, bem informal (mais até, nesse trecho):

[...]
Our informants claim to have an absolute sense of direction and orien-
tation, and to keep this sense when transported far afield. A handful of
anecdotes are perhaps relevant here. We called the bluff of our principal
informant, who claimed to know day and night, awake or asleep, mountain
or plain, where batz'il alan 'true downhill' always lay (a direction he
indicated with precision recurrently). We blindfolded him, and spun him
around over 20 times in a darkened house. Still blindfolded and dizzy, he
pointed in the agreed direction! More methodically, we designed a task
where an informant had to guide another blindfolded informant around a
perfectly flat open space (a coffee-drying patio) by verbal instruction.
English-speakers solve such a task by specifying rotations to the left or right
("turn a little bit to the right, go forward," and so on); our Tzeltal-speakers
solve it by specifying rotations to the 'uphill' or 'downhill' direction,
assuming (correctly) that the blindfold is no significant hindrance.16 An-
other anecdote: we brought a woman into the local market town for medical
treatment; she had rarely been there, and certainly never in the house we
stayed in. In the night, she asked her husband which tap was the hot water
tap in the bathroom by saying ja' bal in ta ajk'ol-i I s it this one uphillward?'.
In general, when informants are in alien surroundings, they use the 'up-
hill'/'downhill' terms with cardinal precision.17

[...]

http://anthroweb.ucsd.edu/~jhaviland/LanguageCulture/READINGS/BrownLevcinsonUphillDownhill.pdf

Queria que esses jornalistas tivessem mais o hábito de citar artigos científicos como os artigos citam uns aos outros, em vez dessas menções mais indiretas e vagas.

[Feliperj]

Mas da parte final grifada discordo frontalmente por ser uma postura idealista, em última análise significa dizer que o Universo só existe por que há seres cognoscentes ( pois realidade e Universo são,em última análise ,  sinônimos).

Eu não acredito nisso e tenho até dificuldade em aceitar que alguém acredite, mas há quem proponha que a realidade seja mesmo nessas linhas. Se não me engano o Fayman (outro forista desses círculos, não o Feinman daqui) acredita numas coisas meio nessas linhas, acho que se baseando naquelas interpretações da MQ com um papel "literal" da consciência... mas posso estar fazendo uma má representação do que ele pensa... lembro que uma vez ele fez qualquer explicação em física que me deixou com a impressão de que o universo de alguma forma "começasse" com a consciência e até mesmo o passado fosse gerado retroativamente por ela... eu acho que manifestei essa impressão e perguntei se era isso mesmo, acho que o que quer que ele tenha postado depois ou não foi claro o suficiente para mim entender que não era isso, ou confirmava essa noção...



Mas deixemos essas questões mais "avançadas"/profundas da natureza de mente e matéria para um tópico específico...

Ola Buckaroo,

Eu sou um desses foristas (ou talvez o único  ).

Na realidade eu cito o trabalho e escritos do Andrei Linde que está pesquisando isto, como consequencia da função de onda do universo, além de ter escrito e postado aqui no forum, como a visão relativistica do universo nos leva a necessidade de se postular a consciência como uma outra entidade fundamental do nosso universo, que para minha grata surpresa, descobri que era a visão de muitos dos relativistas iniciais (Weyl, Eddington, Godell, Minkowski, etc) e outros atuais (atualmente a maioria não se aventura na discussão de consequências filosóficas da teoria, mas defendem o conceito básico que leva a esta consequência : o block universe.)

Acho que o maior problema para a aceitação de algo como o idealismo é a associação da consciência a um ser; a confusão de consciência com personalidade, com a auto-consciência de um ser (coisa que aparentemente, somente humanos, chimps, elefantes e cetáceos possuem). Não se pensa nela como uma entidade básica constituinte do nosso universo, talvez a mais fundamental.

Se quiser debater mais, podemos ir para um tópico especifico.

Link da entrevista do Linde : http://www.closertotruth.com/video-profile/Why-Explore-Consciousness-and-Cosmos-Andrei-Linde-/874

Abs
Felipe